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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GREAT SALT LAKE MINERALS
& CHEMICALS CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ARTHUR G. McKEE &
COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
Defendwit-Respondent.

Appeal No.
13858

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff and appellant, Great
Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corporation ("GSL"),
against its agent, the defendant and respondent, Arthur
G. McKee & Company ("McKee"), for damages in the
sum of $300,000.00, which is the amount of the performance bond which McKee failed to see that its vendor obtain as required in McKee's contract with the vendor for
the design, fabrication and field erection of a conveyor
system for the process plants which GSLi was constructing. GSL proceeded under its first cause of action for
breach of McKee's contractual obligations and alternatively under its second cause of action for liability in
tort. (R. 2-4. y McKee answered denying liability with
Record references are to the numbered pages of the record on
appeal.
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respect to the bond and counterclaimed for the value of
its services performed for GSL in 1970, for which it had
not been paid. (B. 5-9.) GSL did not contest the counterclaim.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court without a jury.
Judgment was entered for McKee on GSL's claim and
on McKee's counterclaim. (R, 96.) GSL's motion for a
new trial (R. 97-99) was denied (R. 100) and this appeal
followed (R. 101).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant GSL seeks the reversal of the district
court's judgment as to GSL's claim and the entry of
judgment in its favor. GSL does not challenge the judgment so far as McKee's counterclaim is concerned.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In so far as possible, the material facts are presented
in order as they developed in the dealings of the parties.
In 1968, GSL was about to undertake the construction of process plants on the shores of the Great Salt
Lake as part of its project for the recovery of minerals
from the lake. GSL sought bids from several engineercontractor firms including McKee to perform the design
and administrative engineering work for the project.
(Tr. 7-9.)2
2
Transcript references are to the pages of the reporter's transcript of the testimony.
Testimony of Harold J. Andrews, who was manager of engineering and construction and later president of GSL during the period of
time involved in this action. (Tr. 6.)

2
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McKee is one of the four or five largest engineercontractor firms in the country. Such companies are considered as experts in their field and provide the full
range of services including procurement and a knowledge
of equipment and manufacturers and subcontractors.
(Tr.65-68.)3
V
McKee responded to GSL's request for bids, through
its Western Knapp Engineering Division in San Francisco, by presenting alternative proposals in writing, one
of which was a proposal that McKee would provide engineering design and related services including, specifically, procurement services which were described by
McKee as including the following (Ex. 1-P) :4
"1. Assistance in equipment selection and bid
evaluation;
"2. Procurement, expediting and inspection assistance as required by client;"
McKee's proposal also included the following representation in its cover letter (Ex. 1-P):
"We assure you that we have the qualified
personnel immediately available to initiate your
program and carry it through in am expeditious
manner to satisfactory completion and start-up."
McKee's proposal for an engineering and procurement
contract was accepted by GSL and they proceeded to
3
Testimony of Bernard Bernstrom, an experienced engineer and
manager of the local office of Roberts & Shaeffer, a national engineer-contractor firm. Mr. Bernstrom testified as an expert witness for
GSL. (Tr. 62.)
4
Exhibit references are to the numbered exhibits received in evidence at the trial.
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draft the agreement. (Ex. 6-P.) McKee's work was to
include among other things, the development and staffing of an organization to carry out all phases of the
engineering work, and, as agent for GSL, the procurement and delivery of all equipment and long lead-time
materials. (Ex. 6-P, at pp. 2-3.) McKee was to provide
the "standards of care, skill and diligence normally provided by a professional engineer in the performance of"
its services. (Ex. 6-P, at p. 15.)
On January 9,1969, GSL and McKee signed a "letter
of intent" which stated their intent to execute the agreement and authorized McKee to commence its services in
accordance with the terms of the proposed contract. (Tr.
13; Ex. 4-P.) Although the agreement was forwarded
to McKee for execution in May, 1969 (Ex. 5-P), it was
never signed (Tr. 27). McKee, however, advised GSL
by letter in August, 1969, that McKee would continue to
serve GSL on the same basis as before. (Ex. 7-P.) The
unsigned agreement incorporated everything that was
involved up to that time (Tr. 26) and both McKee?s assistant general sales manager, Robert Hansen, and McKee's project manager for its task force on the GSL project, Harold McNeil, testified that the unsigned agreement, together with the letter of intent, was considered
by the parties as the equivalent of a contract (Tr. 147,
150, 154, 274). McKee's billings to GSL made specific
reference to the letter of intent in the following language (Ex. 52-D, at pp. 3, 5 and 6):
"To charge your account for Engineering and
Procurement Services for the design and constrttction of process plants at the Great Salt Lake

4
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site near Ogden, Utah, in accordance with the
letter of intent dated January 9, 1969."
McKee subsequently charged GSL (Tr. 154) and was
paid for its services performed prior to January 26,
1970, in accordance with the terms of the unsigned agreement, approximately $1,000,000.00 (Tr. 16).
It had been contemplated from the outset that some
items needed for the process plants would be purchased
as "contract packages" from contractors or "outside
vendors" as discussed in McKee's proposal for its services and in GSL's Design Criteria Package. (Ex. 1-P,
at pp. 3-4; Ex. 3-P, at p. 2) Since there were many vendors5 for the project and their certified drawings were
needed before McKee's engineers could proceed accurately with their final design of the project, Mr. Andrews
and Mr. Brinkmann, GSL's manager of the project, testified that GSL offered the services of its purchasing
agent, Mr. Fay Derricott, to speed up the process of
getting the drawings. (Tr. 42, 54.) A meeting was held
on August 20,1969, to "confirm the expediting procedure
to secure the outstanding engineering information that
is essential to the project schedule." According to McKee's memorandum of the meeting, Mr. Derricott was
to "perform the expediting, which is indicated in the
minutes of weekly meetings and as supplemented by
other communications from McKee Engineering." (Ex.
27-P.)
One of the items to be purchased from vendors was
the conveyor system. (Tr. 12; Ex. 3-P, at p. 2) For such
5
McKee issued fifty purchase orders in the procurement work for
the GSL project. (Tr. 181.)
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purchases McKee's purchasing and construction departments maintained a "list of qualified and acceptable
bidders." (Ex. 24-P, part P-3 at p. 3.) After the lowest
bidder for the conveyor system, Coastal Plains, Inc., refused to give certain warranties required by GrSL, the
parties turned to the next lowest bidder, Houben Industries, Inc. ("Houben"). (Tr. 214-215.) McKee's analysis
of the bids for the conveyor system stated that Houben
had a fairly high degree of experience in the materials
handling field but its experience, facilities and financial
capabilities were inferior to those of Coastal Plains.
(Ex. 8-P, at p. 2.) Mr. McNeil testified that McKee had
made an investigation of Houben including its financial
situation and had concluded that Houben was capable
of supplying the conveyor system. (Tr. 275.) Houben
was not known to GSL's project manager, Mr. Brinkmann, who did not learn until later that Houben would
have to subcontract the fabrication work for the conveyor system. (Tr. 236-237.)
McKee gave Houben a "letter of intent" on August
21, 1969, expressing McKee's intent to purchase from
Houben the design, supply of materials, fabrication and
field erection of the conveyor system and authorizing
Houben to proceed immediately with engineering and
design. (Ex. 9-P.) Mr. Andrews testified that CfSL had
ordered that Houben be bonded (Tr. 102, 105), and McKee, in its letter of intent, asked Houben the cost of
furnishing a $300,000.00 performance bond (Ex. 9-P).
Houben responded the following day by returning a
signed copy of McKee's letter of intent and stating that
the cost of a bond would be 1% or $3,000.00. (Ex. 10-P.)
6
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Later, on September 18, 1969, McKee sent its purchase order for the conveyor system to Houben. (Ex.
11-P.) According to the purchase order, the contract for
the conveyor system was between McKee as the purchaser and Houben as vendor while GrSL was referred
to as the owner of the project, (Ex. 11-P, at p. 1.) The
purchase order called for the design, supply of materials,
fabrication and field erection of the conveyor system for
a fixed price of $597,556.00. A performance bond in the
amount of $300,000.00 was to be obtained by Houben.
(Ex. 11-P, at p. 6.) McKee reserved the right to approve
the form of the bond and the issuer. (Ex. 11-P, at p. 16.)
The bond was not a condition precedent to Houben's
commencement of its work, since McKee's letter of intent
had directed Houben to "proceed immediately with engineering and design" (Ex. 10-P), but Houben was required to furnish copies of the bond to McKee "without
delay" (Ex. 11-P, at p. 5). The certificates for liability
insurance, on the other hand, were to be obtained by
Houben " prior to commencement of construction activities". (Ex. 11-P, at p. 6.)
Mr. Bernstrom testified that the conveyor system
was an essential part of the process plants and that the
design and engineering of the conveyor system was important to the project time schedule. (Tr. 76, 90-91.)
McKee admitted in answers (R. 23) to interrogatories
(R. 13-14), that GSL had not authorized any delay on
Houben's part in obtaining the bond or notified McKee
at any time that the bond was no longer required.6 The
6
McKee's answers to questions 20 and 22 in GSL's first set of
interrogatories. The interrogatories and the answers were received
in evidence as part of the trial record. (Tr. 106-107, 262-263.)
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acting head of McKee's purchasing department, Kenneth
Ferguson, who also served with an assistant as the purchasing agent for the GSL project (Tr. 174, 192, 266),
testified that he knew the bond was important and was
to be obtained without delay (Tr. 183). Mr. Ferguson
had full responsibility for the fifty purchase orders issued by McKee for GSL's project and was accountable
only to McKee's project manager, Mr. McNeil. (Tr. 181182, 191.) Mr. McNeil testified that the purchasing
agent's duties included following up on purchase orders,
obtaining insurance certificates7 and bonds. (Tr. 275.)
Mr. Bernstrom, testifying from his experience in engineering work, explained why a person with Derricott's
assignment with respect to drawings and the flow of the
work as directed by McKee's engineers would have nothing to do with getting bonds. (Tr. 80-81.) He also
testified that the purchasing agent or his immediate
superior would be the person responsible for getting the
bond. (Tr. 81-82.)
Despite the urgency for the bond, as expressed in
McKee's purchase order, Mr. Ferguson testified that he
waited seven weeks until November 6, 1969, to telephone
Houben about the bond and learned then that the bond
had not been obtained. He talked to a Mr. Niepelt of
Houben who told him that the matter was in hand and
the bond would be provided shortly. (Tr. 177.)
On November 18, 1969, Mr. Brinkmann sent a memorandum regarding the bond to Mr. Derricott, who
passed it on with a memorandum of his own to Mr. Fer~
7

The reporter typed "tickets*.
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guson. (Ex. 22-D; Tr. 120, 227.) Mr. Brinkmann testified that he sent the memorandum for the purpose of
seeing that the increased cost of Houben's job and the
work of Houben's subcontractors was covered. (Tr. 49,
52, 224-226, 236-241.)
Although Houben's failure to have obtained the
bond by November 6 was a "red flag" to Mr. Ferguson,
he waited another 2 weeks until November 20 to telephone Houben again about the bond. This time he suggested the name of a bonding company but took no further action. (Tr. 175, 177, 184-185.)
Afterwards, in a deposition before the trial, Mr.
Derricott was asked with reference to Mr. Brinkmann's
memorandum of November 18, whether Mr. Derricott
believed or knew at that time or afterwards that a bond
had not been provided because Mr. Brinkmann had made
no reference in his memorandum to having received a
copy of the bond. (Tr. 126-128.) Derricott said that he
"did not know that a bond had not been provided or that
it had been provided." He also said that it was his assumption or state of mind that a bond had not been provided. (Tr. 125-127.) At the trial he testified that he
did not learn that Houben had not obtained a bond until
construction of the conveyor system was about to commence ne<ar the end of March, 1970. (Tr. I l l , 43.) He
said he felt there was no conflict with his testimony in
the deposition, that it was "all assumptions" at the time
his deposition was being taken and that he doubted that
the questioin whether Houben had obtained a bond had
entered his mind in 1969. (Tr. 132-133.)

9
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Mr. Ferguson maintained a "tickle file'7 for important documents and sent GSL copies of his follow-up
letters to vendors when such documents were missing.
(Exs. 53-P, 54-P, 55-P, 56-R) There was no evidence
that he followed that practice with respect to Houben's
performance bond. When Mr. Ferguson was asked if
he had reported the subject to his telephone conversations with Houben to GSL, he would only say that he
had no recollection of doing so but "probably" he did
or that it was a "possibility" that he did. (Tr. 178, 184185.) He also acknowledged that Mr. Brinkmann and
Mr. Derricott could have assumed that there was a bond
and that "it may not have been unreasonable" for them
to do so; but "it may have been unwise". (Tr. 188,189.)
No evidence was offered that Mr. McNeil, who knew that
Houben did not have the bond (Tr. 276), asked for further instructions from GSL in light of Houben's delay.
Mr. McNeil testified that he did not discuss the bond
with Houben, but spoke to Mr. Ferguson, about it. (Tr.
276.) Mr. McNeil and Mr. Ferguson participated with
counsel for McKee in the preparation of McKee's answers to interrogatories (Tr. 195, 260) where it was expressly stated that GSL was not told that a bond had
not been obtained. (Question No. 9 (R. 12) and the
answer (R. 21).)
When GSL received Houben's first progress billing
(Exs. 41-D, 42-D) it was sent on to Mr. McNeil for approval. The billing was for man hours spent by Houben
on the project and contained no amount for the bond
premium. Mr. McNeil approved the billing and testified
at the trial that there was nothing about the billing to
eause him concern. (Tr. 275-276.)
-..
10
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Mr. Lawrence Parker, a lawyer who had represented
a bonding company that had bonded a subsidiary of
Houben, was called as a witness for McKee. He had been
in the "underwriting aspect"'of the bonding business,
had represented surety companies and was involved in
defending them. (Tr. 156, 172.) He testified as to his
efforts in November 1969 to obtain funds for his client
from Houben. Mr. Parker telephoned on November 14
to ask if GSL would honor an assignment by Houben to
his client, a bonding company, of the money due Houben
on Houben's first progress billing. He was told that GSL
would not. (Tr. 162-163.) Then, without telling GSL of
their "arrangement", Mr. Parker and Houben decided
that GSL would be asked to forward its payment of the
progress billing to Houben in care of Mr. Parker's law
firm and that Houben, without GSL's knowledge, would
execute an assignment of the funds to Mr. Parker's
client. (Tr. 164, 172.) Houben's request was received
in a letter on November 20 (Ex. 29-D) and the payment
was made as requested on December 1, 1969 (Ex. 36-D).
Mr. Parker also testified that after October 1969
and on November 14, when he called GSL, Houben, due
to financial troubles, could not have obtained a bond.
(Tr. 168, 172-173.) Mr. Parker did not say that he told
GSL of Houben's situation. McKee offered no evidence
that Houben could have obtained a bond after October
1969.
Mr. Christensen, GSL's secretary and treasurer, who
did not know that the McKee purchase order required
a bond of Houben (Tr. 199, 200), testified that he considered the possibility that Houben might be in financial
11
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difficulty along with other possible reasons for requesting that the payment be sent to the law firm (Tr. 203,
205-206) and authorized the request bemuse of the
amount involved and because they were beginning on
the Houben contract (Tr. 211). He testified that there
were no similar requests as to later progress payments
and that the later payments were made directly to Houben. Mr. Leland Irvine, a businessman, who testified as
an expert witness for GrSL, gave his opinion and stated
at length the reasons why the telephone call from Parker
and Houben's request to sent the payment of the first
progress billing to Houben in care of a law firm would
not have caused a reasonable businessman to suspect
that Houben was in financial difficulties. (Tr. 282, 290.)
GrSL did not tell McKee of Mr. Parker's telephone call
or of sending the payment of Houben's first progress
billing in care of the law firm.
On December 19, 1969, Mr. Brinkmann wrote to Mr.
McNeil regarding a reduction of McKee's activities
and stated, among other things, that purchasing and expediting would be taken over by GrSL on January 2,
1970. (Ex. 12-P.) On December 29, 1969, Mr. Ferguson
wrote to Houben saying that responsibility for the project would be assumed by GrSL. (Ex. 13-P.) Nothing
was said to GrSL at that time about the bond. McKee
continued to perform services for GSL after that time
under the letter of intent and the unsigned agreement
which services were the basis of McKee's counterclaim.
(Ex. 52-D.)
7
Near the end of March, 1970, as the time for construction of the conveyor system approached, GSL per*12
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sonnel were looking in the Houben file for the certificates of liability insurance needed for the construction
work, and found that the file contained neither insurance
certificates nor the bond. Mr. Brinkmann them telephoned the McKee officers in San Francisco, because he
thought that McKee would have the bond, and was informed that McKee did not have it. (Tr. 43-45.) GSL
then turned to Houben (Tr. 111-112; Ex. 26-P), but the
bond was never obtained (Tr. 22).
On May 13, 1970, while the construction of the conveyor system was underway, Houben notified GSL by
letter that due to Houben's financial condition, it would
have to discontinue its construction activities. (Ex.
14-P.) When McKee declined GSL's request to finish
Houben's work (Tr. 24), GSL concluded the engineering
work with some help from McKee (Tr. 23), and contracted with Jelco, Inc., another contractor on the project, to complete the construction of the conveyor system on the basis of cost plus a fee (Tr. 24). The conveyor system was finally completed at a cost to GSL
of $446,480.25 in excess of the Houben contract price.
(Tr. 24; Ex. 15-P.)
McKee did not deny, through the course of the trial,
that if Houben had obtained the performance bond as
required, a bonding company would have been obligated
to GSL in the amount of $300,000.00 for the completion
of the conveyor system. Both Mr. Ferguson and Mr.
McNeil testified that the bond, if obtained, would have
been available to assist GSL when Houben left the job.
(Tr. 275,183.)
13
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McKee did not challenge Jelco's costs in constructing the conveyor system although McKee had opportunities to do so when it examined Jelco's records before the
trial. (Tr. 277-279.) Instead, testimony was presented
through Mr. McNeil that if McKee had learned in November of Houben's financial troubles, several alternatives would have been available including giving the work
to McKee (who later refused it) or to one of the other
earlier bidders for the conveyor system such as Coastal
Plains. (Tr. 249.) Mr. McNeil testified as to what he
thought it would have cost to have Houben's work finished by other contractors that had bid on the conveyor
system contract. (Tr. 250-258; Ex. 50-D.)
Although time was of the essence in Houben's work
(Ex. 11-P, at p. 13) and time had already been lost when
Coastal Plains declined a contract for the conveyor system (Tr. 215), Mr. McNeil's testimony showed that it
would have taken an additional two to three weeks for
a new contractor just to obtain needed engineering information from Houben's office (Tr. 257). His calculation® did not include the cost to GrSL of any further delays. (Ex. 50-D.) No evidence was offered by McKee
that the original bidders would have taken over Houben's
work at their earlier bid prices, that Coastal Plains, Inc.
would have given the guarantees it had refused to give
before, and that Houben, who was actively pursuing its
work under the McKee purchase order, would have
stepped aside and made its work product and facilities
available to a new contractor. Mr. McNeil acknowledged
that no one at McKee had made contact with the earlier
bidders prior to the trial todetermine whether infact
14
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any one of them would have taken over the Houben work
on the basis of their earlier bids. (Tr. 279-280.) Neither
Mr. McNeil nor any other witness testified that, all
things considered, Houben should have been removed
from the project.
Mr. Bernstrom, an expert witness for GSL, testified
that am owner would try very hard to avoid taking a
contractor off the job. He gave the reasons for his
opinion based upon his experience, namely the attendant
delay, even without Houben's opposition, of five to six
weeks in getting a new contractor on the job, the likelihood of Houben's opposition to removal and its reluctance to turn over its drawings to a new contractor, the
reluctance of a new contractor to rely upon the work
product of the old contractor and the probability that a
new contractor would insist upon more money. (Tr.
291-294,298-299.)
Mr. Bernstrom also testified that McKee should
have seen that the bond was obtained by Houben in not
more than two weeks. (Tr. 72.) In Mr. Bernstrom's
opinion, McKee should not have waited until November
6 to call Houben about the bond. It was very poor practice to wait until November 22 to call Houben the second
time. (Tr. 96.) It was Mr. Bernstrom's opinion that
McKee's performance with respect to the bond was not
in accordance with the care, skill and diligence of a professional engineer. (Tr. 71, 77, 84, 87, 89, 96.) No evidence was offered by McKee to show that it had acted
properly with respect to the bond.
15
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At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court wrote
a memorandum decision stating that GSL was barred,
under doctrines of contributory negligence and waiver,
from recovering against Houben because the trial court
thought Mr. Derricott knew and Mr. Brinkmann knew
or should have known of the bond's absence and because
GSL paid Houben's progress billings when it knew or
should have known of Houben's financial troubles. (E.
86.) Findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment
were requested in accordance with the decision. (B. 88,
91.) The findings of fact and conclusions of law which
were entered raise additional issues not raised in the
trial court's memorandum decision. All of the material
issue-s raised will be treated in our argument.
AEGUMENT
I
McKEE IS LIABLE TO GSL IN THE
AMOUNT OF THE PEEFOEMANCE BOND
WHICH WAS EEQUIBED OF HOUBEN
A. McKee's duties as GSL's procurement agent included the duty to see that Houben was bonded: — It
was acknowledged by McKee in its answers to the first
and third questions in GSL's first interrogatory that
McKee acted as GSL's agent in the procurement of Houben's services to provide the conveyor system for GSL.
(B. 12, 21.) The evidence at the trial shows that this
agency relationship was founded in contract. The witnesses who testified on the subject, Mr. Andrews for
GSL and Mr. Hansen and Mr. McNeil for McKee, were
agreed that the parties considered the Letter of Intent,
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dated January 9, 1969, together with the unsigned Engineering Agreement, to be the equivalent of a contract.
(Exs. 4-P, 6-P; Tr. 24, 26, 147, 150, 154, 274.) McKee
billed GSL for its services and was paid for those services prior to 1970 pursuant to those instruments. (Tr.
154.)
-^
It was an expressed condition of the contract between
GSL and McKee that the latter would act as agent for the
procurement and delivery of all equipment and long lead
time materials (Ex. 6-P, Par. G, pp. 2-3) as McKee had
offered to do in its response to GSL's bid (Ex. 1-P). In
accordance with McKee's representation as to the quality
of the services offered (Ex. 1-P), the contract, as another
expressed condition, provided that McKee would perform in accordance with the care, skill and diligence of
a professional engineer (Ex. 6-P, p. 15).
One of McKee's duties as GSL's procurement agent,
was to purchase a conveyor system for GSL's project
and another duty was to see that the vendor would be
bonded. The evidence of these duties is found in McKee's
undertaking to purchase the conveyor system (Ex. 11-P),
in Mr. Andrews' order that Houben be bonded (Tr. 104),
in his and Mr. Brinkmann's assumption this had been
done (Tr. 243, 43), in McKee's admission in its answer
to the complaint that a performance bond was required
of Houben (par. 5 of the Answer, K. 6), in the acknowledgment in McKee's answers to interrogatories that
GSL did not notify McKee at any time that the bond
was not required and did not authorize any delay in
obtaining the bond (B. 13-14, 23), in McKee's direction
to Houben that McKee be furnished copies of the bond
17
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without delay (Ex. 11-P, at p. 5), in McKee^s reserved
authority to approve the form and the issuer of the bond
(Ex. 11-P, at p. 16), in Mr. McNeil's follow-up with Mr.
Ferguson about the bond (Tr. 276), and in Mr. Ferguson's subsequent follow-up telephone conversations with
Houben to get the bond (Tr. 43-44).
No witness who appeared at the trial on McKee's
behalf testified that McKee was not responsible to see
that the bond was obtained by Houben.
McKee's duty to see that Houben was bonded was as
much a part of the contract as were the expressed conditions. The principle of law involved is discussed in Selections from Williston on Contracts, § 1293, as follows:
"It is not only for breach of express promises
that a contractor is liable but of implied promises
as well; and the most serious difficulty in this
matter is to determine what promises are fairly
to be implied in a given contract. The principle
to be adopted, however, is plain; the difficulty
lies in its application. Since the governing principle in the formation of contract is the justifiable
assumption by one party of a certain intention
on the part of the other, the undertaking of each
promisor in a contract must include any promises
which a reasonable person in the position of the
promisee would be justified in understanding
were included.
"Whenever, therefore, a contract cannot be
carried out in the way in which it was obviously
expected that it should be carried out without one
party or the other performing some act not expressly promised by him, a promise to do that act
must be implied."
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In view of Mr. Andrews' order that the vendor be
bonded, followed by McKee's express directions to that
effect in its purchase order issued to Houben, GrSL was
justified in assuming that McKee intended to see that
Houben was bonded. A promise on McKee's part to
see to the bonding of Houben must be implied. Mr. McNeil's subsequent discussion with Mr. Ferguson about
the bond and Mr. Ferguson's efforts in his telephone
conversations with Houben should refute any argument
that McKee did not undertake to see that Houben was
bonded.
B. McKee's duties as GSL'.s procurement agent included the duty of prompt action including notice with
respect to the performance bond required of Houben:
— When an agency relationship is created there is also
implied a duty of care by the agent for the principal's
interest. This duty, fiduciary in character, has been expressed in Mecham, Outlines of Agency, § 500, in the
following words:
"It is the duty of the agent to> conduct himself with the utmost loyalty and fidelity to the
interests of his principal, * * * .
"When the principal employs an agent, the
law presumes that he does so in order to secure
to himself the benefits of the agent's skill, experience or discretion, and to reap the fruits of the
performance of the undertaking. The law presumes that he expects — and it gives him the
right to expect — that the agent so employed will
endeavor to further the principal's interests, and
will use his powers for the principal's benefit;
# # *

y>
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This duty of care was further explained in this court's
opinion in State Automobile & Casualty Under, v. Salisbury, 27 U.2d 229, 494 P.2d 529, 531-532 (1972), as follows:
"It is true that the rights and duties of principal and agent inter se are primarily fixed by
the contract between them. But also to be considered in connection therewith are the mutual
responsibilities the parties have to each other
which are implied from the operation of law applicable to such relationship. Arising from what
is commonly known and accepted as to the customs and experience in the everyday affairs of
life, the parties each has the right to assume that
the other will perform the duties he agrees to with
reasonable care, competence, diligence and good
faith, even though such terms are not expressly
spelled out in the contract; and if failure to so
perform those duties results in damage to the
other party he is entitled to recover for breach
of the contractual duties."
In that case the principal recovered from its agent the
money paid out under a policy of insurance which was
issued contrary to the principal's instructions.
The duty of care includes the duty to act promptly
and to notify the principal of material facts. This duty
is discussed in Mecham, Outlines of Agency, § 541, as
follows:
" * * * It is the duty of the agent to give the principal timely notice of all facts coming to the
agent's knowledge, relating to the subject matter
of the agency, which it is material for the prin.
cipal to know for the protection of his interests,
and which the agent can and may communicate
to him. * # * "
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"If he has undertaken to care for, protect or
represent the principal's property or interests,
and such property or interests are attacked or
threatened or imperiled by hostile forces or impending dangers or wrongful acts, it would ordinarily be the agent's duty to inform the principal, so that he may take such steps as he desires to protect his interests. If the agent finds
himself unable or unwilling to carry out undertakings for which the principal depends upon him,
he should give the principal timely notice, that he
may make other arrangements. * * * "
The agent's obligation of prompt action including
notice to the principal has been recognized in the cases
where the agent failed to procure insurance for the principal's protection. The insurance cases are instructive
and helpful because they show the application of the
duty of prompt action and notice in situations where the
principal's protection through insurance is part of the
agent's obligation. In the annotation, Duty and Liability
of Insurance Broker cos Agent to Insured ivith Respect
to Procurement, Continuance, Terms, and Coverage of
\nsurance Policies, 29 ALE2d 165, § 9, the principle is
stated in, the following language (at p. 184):
"An insurance agent or broker who undertakes to procure insurance in accordance with instructions must motify his principal if he cannot
obtain the insurance seasonably or upon the terms
and conditions requested. * * * "
Again, in 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 175, it is stated
(footnotes omitted):
"An agent or broker who undertakes to procure insurance in accordance with instructions
impliedly undertakes to give notice to his client
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in the event of his failure to procure such insurance. Unless there is an agreement to the contrary, he is bound to act promptly to obtain the
insurance on the terms and conditions directed,
and if he cannot obtain the insurance seasonably
or upon such terms or conditions, he must notify
his principal of such fact within a reasonable
time, and if he fails to do so he makes himself
liable for damages suffered by his client from
lack of insurance."
"Where the agent fails to procure insurance
in accordance with his instructions, the person
employing him for that purpose is not eontributorily negligent because of not seeking to obtain
insurance through other means where he has not
been notified that a policy of insurance has not
been issued."
The special urgency for prompt action and notice
where insurance is involved was expressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Coffey v. Polimeni, 188 F.2d 539 (1951), where an insurance broker failed to act on an application for fire
insurance. Counsel for the defendant had argued that
no action would lie for an agent's delay where there was
no breach of a legal duty to obtain insurance. The court
responded to the argument in the following words (188
F.2d at 542-543 (footnotes omitted):
"Counsel argue that, assuming negligence,
the correct rule is that no action will lie against
an insurance agent for delay in acting on an application where no breach of legal duty to obtain
insurance appears. They concede that this view
is at variance with the general trend of authority
and with the great bulk of the decisions dealing
immediately with the subject. A few commen-
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tators and an occasional judge have critized this
line of decisions as unorthodox or unsupported
by reason, but they appear to us to announce a
salutary rule. The thought they stand for is that
the agent or company owes the applicant for insurance what amounts to a legal obligation to act
with reasonable promptness on his application,
either by providing the desired coverage or by
notifying the applicant of the rejection of the
risk so that he may not be lulled into a feeling
of security or put to prejudicial delay in seeking
protection elsewhere. Implicit in the cases is a
recognition that these transactions are fundamentally unlike ordinary commercial or business
dealings where mere profit is the stake, so prone
is the failure of insurance protection to result
in irretrievable disaster to the individual. Those
engaged in the insurance business understand
perfectly the peculiar urgency of the need for
prompt attention in these matters."
Although McKee is not engaged in the insurance
business, as the defendant in the Coffey case was, McKee
did undertake to protect GSL's interests where insurance was involved. The need for the bond and for
prompt action in this case was perfectly understood.
This is evident in the provisions of McKee's purchase
order calling for the bond to be obtained without delay,
in McKee's reserved authority to approve the issuer and
the form of the bond and in Mr. Ferguson's testimony
that he knew the bond was important and was to be obtained without delay. (Tr. 183.)
C. GSL was damaged by McKee's failure to act
promptly and is entitled to recover from McKee the
amount of the bond: — Both Mr. Ferguson and Mr.
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McNeil testified that if the bond had been obtained it
would have been available to assist GrSL when Houben
left the job. (Tr. 183, 275.) Mr. Bernstrom testified that
McKee was not justified in waiting seven weeks until
November 6 and again until November 20 to telephone
Houben about the bond. (Tr. 72, 77, 84, 87, 89, 96.)
Mr. Parker, a lawyer experienced with bonding companies and familiar with Houben's circumstances at the
time, gave his opinion that the opportunity for Houben
to obtain a bond had passed after October 1969 and,
when asked by the trial court, stated that this was so on
November 14, 1969, when he called GrSL about an assignment of funds by Houben for Mr. Parker's client. (Tr.
168, 172-173.) McKee's personnel, after investigation,
had concluded that Houben was a "qualified and acceptable bidder" (Ex. 24-P, part P-3 at p. 3; Tr. 275) and
gave Houben the contract in the form of McKee's purchase order. No attempt was made at the trial to challenge Houben^s qualifications for the work. No evidence
was offered that Houben, if McKee had acted promptly
in its supervision of its purchase order, could not have
obtained the required performance bond. Nor was any
evidence offered to contradict Mr. Parker's testimony
that after October 1969 it was too late for Houben to
obtain a bond.
Under the provisions of a performance bond of the
kind required of Houben/ GrSL would have been obligated first of all to pay the contract price for the conveyor system. Then the surety would have been obli8
An example of the type of bond that should have been obtained
was received in evidence, without objection, as Ex. 16-P. (Tr. 5.)
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gated either to complete Houben's contract or to make
funds available for its completion up to but not exceeding
the amount of the bond, $300,000.00. And, finally, GSL
would have had to pay the balance, if any, for the completion of the work, in this case $146,480.00. Instead,
since there was no bond, GSL was obligated to pay the
total of the contract price plus the overrun of $446,480.00.
(Tr. 24, Ex. 15-P.) GSL's evidence in this respect was
not contradicted by McKee.
The measure of damages where the protecton of insurance has been lost is expressed in the ALK2d Annotation referred to supra, p. 21, as follows (29 ALR2d,
§ 29, at p. 203):
"The measure of the liability of an insurance
agent or broker for his failure to procure insurance is the amount that would have been due under the insurance policy if it had been obtained."
In Couch On Insurance, vol. 2d, at § 25:32, the principle
is stated as follows:
"An agent or broker who in any respect violates his duties to the insured is personally liable
to him for the damages caused by his default, that
is, for the amount which could have been recovered from the insurer had the proper insurance
been obtained."
We submit that McKee's conduct in waiting seven
weeks to contact Houben about the bond and in failing
to notify GSL of the delay was a breach of McKee's
duty as GSL's agent, whether that conduct is judged by
the standard of reasonableness expressed in State Automobile & Casualty Under., supra, p. 20, or by the contract's standard — the care, skill and diligence of a
25
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professional engineer — which Mr. Bernstrom testified
McKee failed to meet. (Tr. 77, 81-82, 84, 87, 89, 96.) We
further submit that the measure of GSL's damage in
this case, which it is entitled to recover from McKee,
is the amount of the performance bond.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT GSL IS BARRED BY WAIVER
OR CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR IS
ESTOPPED FROM RECOVERING FROM
McKEE
A defendant who relies upon waiver, contributory
negligence or estoppel in order to avoid liability assumes a burden of proof which McKee has failed to
meet. The elements of these defenses are simply not
present in this case.
A. GSL did not waive its rights as against McKee
with respect to the bond: — In this court's opinion in
Schwab Safe & Loch Co. v. Snow, 47 Ut. 199, 152 Pa^.
171, 176 (1915), waiver was defined in the following
language :
"But what is a "waiver"? It is defined as
n
being the " voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known legal right and implies an election to dispense with something of value or forego
some advantage which the party waiving it might
at his option, have demanded or insisted upon."
4 Words and Phrases (2d Ser.) 1226, 1227. A
. •> waiver may or may not rest in contract. If it
does, it, like all other contracts, requires some
consideration. * * * "
26
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The Schwab case involved the question whether the defendant had waived its cause of action for defendant's
failure to deliver goods as contracted. The Court found
the casual correspondence between the parties insufficient to establish an intentional relinquishment of a
known legal right.
The requirement of consideration referred to in
the Schwab case, were a waiver of contractual obligations is alleged, is discussed in Selections from Williston
on Contracts, § 680, as follows:
"Either prior to the time for performing a
contract, or after its breach, the parties may
agree that one or both of them shall do something
different from the performance which the original contract specified. If the agreement is made
after breach, it is in accord, and when executed
it is an accord and satisfaction. The new contract
may be like the old except for the single particular of the time of performance. Thus, where,
after failure to carry out a marriage contract at
the agreed time, negotiations are begun to arrange for a subsequent date, whatever rights may
have accrued from such failure are thereby discharged. If the new agreement is made when
there has as yet been no breach of the original
contract, it is not technically an accord but the
principles involved are the same, being merely
those involved in the formation of any contract.
Whether the agreement is made before or after
breach, therefore, there must be consideration to
support it."
In 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 159, it is
stated that where substantial rights are involved and in
the absence of an estoppel, a waiver of rights based upon
contract requires consideration.
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In a later case, Phoenix Insurcmce Co. v. Heath, 90
Ut. 187, 61 P.2d 308 (1936), an agent was held liable for
delay in cancelling a policy of insurance. The agent
had argued that his principal had waived a provision
in the agency contract by which defendant was required
to immediately reduce the coverage of a policy of insurance when instructed by plaintiff. The claim of waiver
was based on the fact that plaintiff had replied to defendant's initial letter seeking a reconsideration of the
ordered reduction. The Court, in holding there was no
waiver in the facts of the case, said that waiver is the
"intentional relinquishment of a known right" and went
on to stress the importance of a distinct intentional relinquishment in the following language (61 R2d at 311):
u # # # rp0 c o n s titute a waiver, there must be an
existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge
of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.
It must be distinctly made, although it may be
expressed or implied. * * * "
From the foregoing decisions, it is clear that before
a party may be held to have waived its rights with respect to another party, the latter must establish the
following points with respect to the party against whom
waiver is claimed:
1. the party asserting his rights must know of them,
2. he must have relinquished his rights intentionally,
3. the waiver must have been distinctly made, and
4. where the rights rest in contract, consideration
is required.
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It is also necessary that the party claiming the
benefits of waiver establish his own position as one who
understood and accepted the alleged waiver. This point
is expressed in the following quotation from 28 Am. Jur.
2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 158 (footnotes omitted):
"As in other situations, the question whether
waiver will be found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of the party
against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect
which his conduct has had upon the other party.
There is no waiver unless the waiver is so intended by one party and so understood and accepted by the other. * * * "
Finally, it is necessary that the party claiming the
benefits of waiver establish that the alleged waiver was
timely. This point is discussed in 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 157 as follows (footnotes omitted):
"The term 'waiver' implies a choice or an
election to dispense with something of present
value or to forego some present advantage. Therefore, to constitute a waiver, the right or privilege
claimed to have been waived must generally have
been in existence at the time of the purported
Turning to the facts of this case and looking first
to GrSL's conduct, there is evidence of a distinct expressed intent that Houben's work be bonded. First of all,
(xSL ordered that Houben be bonded. Later, on November 18, 1969, the memoranda of Mr. Brinkmann and
Mr. Derricott regarding the coverage and amount of the
bond were sent to McKee. And still later, in March
1970, Mr. Brinkmann telephoned McKee for the bond.
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This conduct is entirely inconsistent with the idea that
GSL was not concerned about the bond or did not look
to McKee to see that the bond was obtained. There was
no evidence that GSL ever expressed an intent to waive
its rights with respect to the bond.
The trial court evidently thought that an intent on
GSL's part to waive its rights with respect to the bond
can be implied from the payment of Houben's progress
billings. ( B . 86-87.) We fail to see any connection between the payment of a progress billing for services
rendered and an intentional relinquishment of GSL's
rights with respect to the bond. The trial court offered
no explanation of such a connection and none was offered
by any witness at the trial. If there was a connection it
surely would have been seen by Mr. McNeil and Mr.
Ferguson, McKee's project manager and purchasing
agent, but they saw none. They discussed with each
other Houben's delay in obtaining the bond and Mr.
McNeil approved GSL's payment of the progress billing
while Mr. Ferguson telephoned Houben about the bond.
(Tr. 175, 177, 184-185, 275-276.)
The method of disbursing funds to Houben under
the first progress billing, where the money was sent to
Houben in care of a law firm, resulted from the undisclosed arrangement between Mr. Parker and Houben.
Again, we are at a loss to see any connection between
the method of disbursing Houben's funds and a distinct
intentional relinquishment of GSL's rights with respect
to the bond. No connection was offered by any witness.
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So far as any evidence of consideration for GSL's
waiver of contractual rights against McKee is concerned,
none was offered.
Turning to McKee's position, there is no evidence
that it understood or accepted a waiver by GSL of the
bond. As we have noted, the evidence is that Mr. Ferguson and Mr. McNeil acted as though they thought the
bond was required. Although both men had the opportunity to do so at the trial, neither said he thought GSL
had waived the requirement of the bond or that McKee
was not accountable for the bond's absence.
Turning to the time element, the uncontradicted
evidence is that the payment of Houben's progress billings occurred after it was no longer possible for Honben
to be bonded.
B. The defense of contributory negligence is not
available to McKee in this case: — In the first place,
negligence on GSL's part would not relieve McKee of
liability under GSL's first cause of action for breach of
McKee's contract with GSL. As stated in Williston On
Contracts, § 1012 C,at pp. 40-41 (footnotes omitted):
"One who holds himself out as exercising a
profession, occupation, or business thereby represents that he is competent to perform services
incident to that profession, occupation, or business; and is bound to exercise the skill which is
reasonable in view of that representation.
. . .

"The employee is none the less liable though
the principal was negligent, for the basis of lia-
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bility is not tort but contract, and the employer
is under no duty to the employee to be careful
about his own affairs. * * * "
Even if GrSL had no cause of action for breach of
contract and was limited to its second cause of action
for negligence, its payment of Houben's progress billings
was not contributory negligence on Gf-SL's part. The elements of contributory negligence, as set forth in Larson
v. Evans, 12 U.2d 245, 364 P.2d 1088, 1091 (1961), are
"(1) Negligence for which plaintiff is responsible
* * *. (2) Causal connection between such negligence
and the injury complained of. * * * " No evidence was
offered to show in what way GrSL's payment of Houben's
progress billings and the continuation of Houben on the
project was negligent. No evidence was offered of any
advantage to GrSL from nonpayment of the progress
billings or from Houben's removal from the project.
And no evidence was offered of any connection between
what GrSL did and the injury GrSL sustained by reason
of McKee's failure to act promptly to see that Houben
was bonded.
What GSL did in continuing with Houben on the
project in 1970 was done in reliance upon McKee's implied promise to act promptly in its supervision of its
purchase order issued to Houben and, in the absence of
notice to the contrary, in the belief that the bond had
been obtained.
As Professor Prosser has stated in The Law of
Torts, 4th ed., pp. 416-417, 420, the standard of conduct
for the plaintiff and the defendant is not the same. The
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plaintiff can be justified in relying upon the defendant
to protect him. We have shown (supra, p. 19) that in
a case such as this one, where a principal employs an
agent to look after the principal's interests, "the law
presumes that" the principal "expects — and it gives him
the right to expect — that the agent so employed will
endeavor to further the principal's interests, and will
use his powers to his [the principal's] benefit". The
point is stated in State Automobile & Casualty Under.
v. Salisbury, supra, p. 20, in these words, referring to
the parties in an agency relationship, "each has the
right to assume that the other will perform the duties
he agreed to with reasonable care, competence, diligence
and good faith * * * ."
Mr. Brinkmann and Mr. Andrews testified that they
assumed that the bond had been obtained. (Tr. 243,
44-45.) Clearly it was not negligence for GSL to do what
the law expected and gave it the right to do in this case.
It is for this reason that the courts, in insurance cases,
have held that where there is a total failure to procure
insurance, the principal, in the absence of notice, is not
contributorily negligent for failing to obtain other insurance. Even in cases where there was a partial failure
of performance, in that a policy with the wrong terms
was obtained, it has been held that failure of the insured
to read the policy was not contributory negligence. See
the Annotation cited at p. 21, supra, 29 ALR2d at p.
186.
As noted above, no evidence was offered of a causal
connection between what GSL did and the injury sustained by reason of the bond's absence. One of the very
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risks for which the bond was to have provided protection — an unbonded vendor with financial problems —
had become a reality before Mr. Parker's telephone call
or Houben's letter concerning the method of payment
was received and before the payment of any of Houben's
progress billings.
If the parties had not been ignorant of the circumstances which made it impossible for Houben to obtain
a bond in November and thereafter, all that could then
have been required of GrSL at that point in time was
that it act reasonably under the circumstances so as not
to enhance unduly the financial loss that GSL would
suffer should Houben fail to complete the conveyor system. GrSL could not have been asked to incur risks or to
sacrifice its substantial right to timely completion of the
conveyor system by changing contractors in order to
minimize McKee's liability for failure to see that Houben obtained the bond. 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages at §§
30, 32-33.
No one testified for McKee that in their opinion
Houben should have been removed from the job and replaced by another contractor in November or at any
later time. The trial court did not find that there would
have been advantage to GSL in removing Houben from
the job or in refusing to pay Houben for work performed.
Such a move is fraught with problems of time and cost,
as Mr. Bernstrom testified. (Tr. 291-294, 298-299.) In
his opinion as an expert, and the only witness to testify
as to what should have been done, the reasonable course
to pursue would have been the course that was followed
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by the parties in ignorance of the true situation, namely
to continue with Houben on the job.
When Houben left the job, GSL proceeded on the
most economical basis open to it by completing, with
McKee's help, the remaining engineering and by employing, on a cost basis, another contractor which was already
at the job site, to complete the remaining construction
work which McKee had refused to do. (Tr. 23-24.)
C. This is not a case for the application of the doctrine of estoppel: — Although the trial court did not
mention estoppel in its decision, it did state in its conclusion of law No. 6 that GSL was estopped from recovering from McKee. (R. 92.) We believe that the
application of the doctrine of estoppel in this case is
entirely misplaced. Estoppel has to do with preventing
a party from denying some material fact, as explained
in Migliaccio v. Davis, 120 Ut. 1, 232 P.2d 195, 198
(1951):
" * * * Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is
the principal by which a party who knows or
should know the truth is absolutely precluded,
both at law and in equity, from denying or asserting the contrary of, any material fact, which, by
his words or conduct, affirmative or negative,
intentionally or through culpable negligence, he
has induced another, who was excusably ignorant
of the true facts and who had a right to rely upon
such words and conduct, to believe and act upon
them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be
anticipated, changing his position in such a way
that he would suffer injury if such denial or contrary assertion were allowed."
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The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions
of law do not disclose what material fact it thought GrSL
should be precluded from contradicting. No one testified
that McKee changed its position to its injury because of
anything done or said by GrSL.

n i
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THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
In challenging the trial court's findings of fact we
do not ask this court to substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the trial court on issues of fact where the
evidence is in conflict or where reasonable minds might
differ in their interpretation of the evidence. We assume the burden of showing error in respect to material
questions of fact in that (1) the facts as found are without sufficient evidentiary support in the record and (2)
the trial court failed to find facts for which there was
credible uncontradicted evidence. Martin v. Martin, 29
U.2d 413, 510 P.2d 1102, 1103 (1973); DeVas v. Noble,
13 U.2d 133, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962); Charlton v.
Hackett, 11 U.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961).
A. It was error to fail to find that there was a contract of employment between GSL and McKee pursuant
to which McKee acted as GSL's agent in the procurement
of the conveyor system for GSL's process plants: —
Witnesses for both parties testified that the Letter of
Intent and the unsigned Engineering Agreement were
considered by the parties as the equivalent of a contract
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pursuant to which McKee performed as GSL's agent and
was paid for its services. (Tr. 16, 147, 154, 274). No
evidence was offered to the contrary.
B. It was error to fail to find that McKee was the
contracting party with Houben for the conveyor system
and had all the powers reserved to McKee m its purchase order including full authority to act in GSL's best
interest with respect to the bonding of Houben: — See
the purchase order McKee issued to Houben. (Ex. 11-P.)
C. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 6 (R. 89)) that
GSL assumed "the duty or obligation to inquire of Houben as to the status of the performance bond, to see
that the bond was procured, to inquire of Houben or
others as to Houben's ability to provide said performance bond, or to advise GSL of these matters":—No such
finding was intimated in the trial court's memorandum
decision. The finding contradicts the trial court's conclusions of law which necessarily presume a duty
on McKee's part to see that Houben was bonded.
No witness who testified for McKee ever said that
GSL assumed such responsibility. The evidence is
all one way in pointing to McKee as the party with the
duty as to the bond. The date of GSL's purported assumption to responsibility for the bond is stated in the
finding to be August 21, 1969. McKee's purchase order,
issued five weeks later, clearly directed that copies of
the bond be sent not to GSL but to McKee and reserved
to McKee approval of the form and the issuer of the
bond. (Ex. 11-P, at pp. 5, 16.) Mr. Ferguson, who was
37
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

acting head of McKee ?s purchasing department and over
all of McKee's jobs, had assigned himself with an assistant to the GSL project. (Tr. 192, 266, 174.) He had
responsibility for the fifty purchase orders issued by
McKee and was accountable only to Mr. McNeil, the
project manager. (Tr. 181-182, 191.) Mr. Ferguson followed up on important non-engineering documents from
vendors (Exs. 53-P, 54-P, 55-P, 56-P) and was the person who telephoned Houben about the bond on November
6 and again on November 20, 1969, evidently after his
superior, McNeil, had spoken to him about it (Tr. 175,
177, 184-185, 276). Mr. McNeil testified that the purchasing agent's duties included following up on bonds
(Tr. 275) as did Mr. Bernstrom (Tr. 80-81). Mr. McNeil
also testified that the responsibility and duties of McKee on the work that it was doing for GSL's project did
not change. (Tr. 274.)
GSL lent its assistance to McKee's engineering department in the form of Mr. Derricott to act under the
direction of that department in securing engineering information from vendors. A meeting was held on August
200, and a memorandum was made of the meeting by
McKee to confirm Mr. Derrieott's duties. (Ex. 27-P.)
The memorandum states that the subject of the meeting
was the securing of "outstanding engineering information that is critical to the project schedule" and that Mr.
Derricott was to perform expediting as "indicated in
the minutes of weekly meetings and as supplemented by
other communications from McKee Engineering." The
decision of the parties, as expressed in the memorandum,
was in accord with the testimony of Mr. Andrews and
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Mr. Brinkmann that GSL had offered the services of
Mr. Derricott to speed up the process of getting certified drawings from vendors because there were so
many vendors and their certified drawings were needed
by McKee's engineers so that they could tie the pieces
of equipment to be supplied by vendors into the overall
design of the project and prepare the construction drawings to be used by the contractor for building purposes.
(R. 42, 54.) Mr. Derricott's duties were clearly fixed by
the testimony of Mr. Andrews and Mr. Brinkmann and
by McKee's memorandum of the meeting. Mr. Derricott's
testimony and the testimony of Mr. Bernstrom, speaking as an experienced engineer, was to the same effect.
(Tr. 113, 115-118, 80-81.) McKee offered no witness to
contradict its memorandum or the testimony of GSL's
witnesses. No evidence was offered that anyone from
GSL was ever asked by McKee, in the minutes of weekly
meetings or otherwise, to follow up on the bond.
D. It was error to fail to find that had McKee
acted promptly with respect to the bonding of Houben,
a bond would have been issued and a surety company
would have been obligated to GSL, to the extent of
$300,000.00, for the completion of the conveyor system:
—McKee had investigated Houben, including its financial situation, and concluded that it was qualified as a
bidder for the conveyor system and capable of doing the
work. (Tr. 275; Ex. 24-P, part P-3 at p. 3.) McKee never
denied that Houben could have obtained a bond before
November 1969. Mr. Ferguson and Mr. McNeil both
testified that a bond, if obtained, would have beeiri avail-
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able to assist GSL. (Tr. 183, 275.) GSL's evidence with
respect to the bond (Ex. 16-P) went unchallenged.
E. It was error to fail to find that McKee waited
revert oight- weeks after its purchase order to Houben was
issued, at which time Houben no longer could obtain a
bond to contact Houben the first time about the bond,
that McKee waited another two weeks to telephone
Houben a second time and then waited without taking
further action with respect to the bonding of Houben:
— See the testimony of Mr. Ferguson. (Tr. 175, 177,
184485.)
F. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 8 (B. 90) that
Mr. Derricott and Mr. Brinkmann knew at all times that
Houben had not obtained a bond: — There is no evidence
that Mr. Brinkmann learned of the bond's absence before he telephoned McKee in March 1970. The only evidence with respect to Mr. Derricott's "knowledge", which
he denied, is the excerpt from his deposition which was
read into the record and which was limited by McKee's
counsel to November 18, 1969, and thereafter. (Tr. 126128, 132-133.) Finding No. 8 is contradicted by Finding
No. 11 which says that GSL was not told until after
November 20 of the bond's absence. (R. 90.)
Gr. It was error to fail to find that GSL expressed
a continued intent that Houben be bonded: — The evidence in this respect is the order that Houben be bonded,
the memoranda sent to McKee in November 1969 on the
subject of the amount and coverage of the bond and the
telephone call to McKee for the bond in March 1970.
(Tr. 104, 120, 227, 43-44; Ex. 22-D.)
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H. It was error to find {Fdg. No. 9 (R. 90)) that
GSL knew or should have known on November 14 of
Houben's financial difficulties and that Houben "probably" would not have been able to secure a bond at that
time: — No one testified to that effect. Mr. Parker's
testimony shows that when he telephoned GSL on that
date he said nothing of financial troubles on Houben's
part. (Tr. 162-163.) Mr. Irvine testified that there was
nothing in the telephone call to cause a reasonable business man to believe that Houben was in trouble. (Tr.
282-290.) Mr. Parker's opinion as to Houben's ability
to get a bond on November 14 was not qualified. He did
not say "probably"; he said Houben could not get a
bond then. (Tr. 168-169, 172-173.) McKee never called
anyone to testify that there was any possibility of Houben's getting a bond on November 14 or afterwards.
I. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 11, R. 90)) that
shortly after Mr. Ferguson's telephone calls of November 6 and 20 to Houben, the information was relayed to
GSL that Houben was still working on the bond and it
was error to fail to find that McKee did not tell GSL
that the bond was delayed and did not seek instructions
of GSL when McKee learned of Houben's delay: — The
only possible basis in the record for Finding No. 11 is
Mr. Ferguson's testimony that probably or possibly he
told someone at GSL of his telephone calls. (Tr. 178,
184-185.) This testimony doesn't even rise to the level of
contradicting McKee's sworn answers to interrogatories,
which were received in evidence (Tr. 106-107, 262-263),
where it was expressly stated that GSL was not told
that a bond had not been obtained (Question No. 9 (B.
12) and the answer (B. 21)).
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J. It was error to find {Fdg. No. 12 (R. 90)) that
on November 14, when Mr. Parker telephoned GSL, his
client then had am assignment from Houben, that he
ashed GSL to agree to the terms of that assignment and
that GSL did agree: — This is certainly not Mr. Parker's
testimony. He testified that there was no assignment
until after GSL had told him it would not honor an assignment and he and Houben had decided upon their
"arrangement", which they concealed from GSL, for
getting funds to Parker's client. (Tr. 162-164, 172.)
K. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 13 (R. 91)) that
McKee's engineering and procedurement services were
terminated on January 2,1970: — What was effected on
that date was a reduction in forces. McKee continued
to perform engineering and procurement services for
GSL, in the case of "purchasing" to March 22, and in the
case of "engineering" to April 19, 1970, as McKee's
billings to GSL show. (Ex. 52-D at pp. 4 and 6.)
L. It was error to fail to find that no benefit would
have accrued to GSL from refusing to pay Houben after
November 1969 or in removing Houben from the job:—
Mr. Bernstrom, an experienced engineer, testified at
length as to the reasons why the parties, if they had
known of Houben's situation, would not have removed
Houben from the job. (Tr. 291-294, 298-299.) No attempt
was made by McKee to contradict this evidence and no
witness called by McKee said that it would have been to
GSL's benefit to refuse to pay Houben for services performed or to remove Houben. Clearly, McKee, as the
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contracting party with Houben and knowing there was
no bond, thought it appropriate for GSL to pay Houben.
(Tr.276.)
We submit that there is not much similarity between
the case tried to the court below and the case presented in
the findings of fact. In material respects the findings
are prejudicial to GSL in that they do not resolve the
fact issues in accordance with the evidence.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment entered by
the trial court should be reversed and the case remained
to the trial court with directions to enter judgment for
GSL on its claim against McKee. Since the evidence is
not in conflict, so far as the material issues of facts are
concerned, a retrial of the case is not required. Ralph
A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan Ass'n, 94
Ut. 97, 75 P.2d 669, 681 (1938).
Respectfully submitted,
SENIOR & SENIOR
Claron C. Spencer
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
January 1975
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